On 5 December, European Commission leaders and US ministers met The 3rd Ministerial Summit of the EU-US Trade Technology Council (TTC) will be held in Washington, DC. Launched last September, the TTC initiative aims to foster continued transatlantic cooperation on key technology and trade issues. But recent disagreements between the European Union and the United States threatened to overshadow that cooperation and disrupt the summit.

“buy americanUS Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provisions have frustrated EU leaders. who is afraid Massive subsidies to American industry will result in companies fleeing Europe.On the other hand, the Biden administration complain Behind this is the EU’s reluctance to make more active use of the TTC against China.From these controversies, the apparent lack of concrete new results, and the TTC negotiations, some of the largest transatlantic technical and trade issues (IRAs and legal conundrum Transatlantic data flow – have led many observers We conclude that the days of TTC are counted.

However, as the TTC summit in May involved, some exaggeration As part of the initiative’s success story, the doomsday judgment regarding the current state of play is also misunderstood. These dire predictions are largely due to unrealistic expectations and an incomplete understanding of the closely linked scope of the TTC and the functioning of the EU.

Understanding TTCs

The European Commission and the Biden administration have established the TTC as a non-binding instrument.By doing so, they The failure of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership initiative And the damage the Trump era has done to EU-US relations. The non-binding setting of the TTC leaves the European Commission in control and limits the role of Member States and the European Parliament. This simplifies negotiations and facilitates an agile approach to address common evolving challenges. However, this also means that the scope and applicability of TTC decisions are inherently limited.

EU and US take a low-key stance at first TTC summit dedication To “coordinate approaches to key global technological, economic and trade issues and base policies on shared democratic values”. Importantly, both sides stressed that TTC cooperation would not interfere with her EU and US regulatory autonomy. yes, big expectations The idea that the TTC would enable rapid regulatory adjustments in the governance of digital platforms, for example, was naive at best.

Similarly, Desire in America Making the TTC into a geopolitical instrument aimed at China is largely at odds with the reality of the EU. Ursula von der Leyen’s “Geopolitical CommissionIt may, at least in part, share U.S. ambitions and take a somewhat firm stance against China. But that is not the case for the 27 Member States and the Union as a whole. European foreign and security policy continues to be shaped primarily in her EU capital, rather than in Brussels, and is often poorly coordinated between member states.

The issue of export controls in the context of the TTC illustrates this.At the Paris summit, leaders and, accordingly, the media, lauded the collaborative and unprecedented EU and US technology export restrictions on Russia and Belarus As one of TTC’s biggest success stories. Indeed, her TTC involvement between European Commission and White House officials played a role in facilitating rapid coordination of these controls. Ultimately, however, it was Member States who negotiated and decided on measures in the Foreign Affairs Council, outside of the TTC’s auspices. Crucially, it was the imminent security threat of war in the EU’s neighbors that compelled the member states to quickly form alliances.

This is fundamentally different from using the TTC to get the EU on board with new US policy. approach Shift to strategic technology export controls to China. This is intended to limit China’s military and technological development. Even though it is in the EU Admitted Contrary to the geopolitical importance of broader allied export controls at the TTC’s first summit, the bloc’s reality is that the power to implement such controls rests with the Member States, not the European Commission. means And, importantly, threat perceptions and economic dependencies regarding China differ not only between EU member states, but also between the EU and the US.

It is therefore not surprising that the United States still has We’re screwed Persuade key member states to follow export control approaches to China. It is also unreasonable to expect the TTC, a commission-led technology and trade initiative, to deliver concrete results on this security policy issue. The composition of the TTC and the realities of EU foreign policy mean that the initiative cannot be the direct geopolitical tool the US envisions.

TTC value

That said, the TTC can make a valuable contribution in fine-tuning the geopolitical course. It can foster coordination, promote mutual understanding, adhere to common policy principles, and help develop compelling narratives, thereby setting the tone and baseline for further action. But these small steps are hard to sell as grand milestones that political leaders and the media would love to see.

Such a small step this week publication Two TTC initiatives for secure digital infrastructure projects in Jamaica and Kenya. The project itself has had limited impact and barely made the headlines. But these are clear EU and US reactions to China’s aggressive global infrastructure investment. This new trans-Atlantic collaboration on connectivity investments in third countries, involving a range of key stakeholders, including development and funding agencies, could have lasting and meaningful effects. therefore, Proposed A memorandum of understanding signed between the US Development Finance Corporation and the European Investment Bank to strengthen connectivity finance cooperation would have geopolitical significance if honored.

Furthermore, while the TTC cannot facilitate full regulatory coordination in technology policy between the EU and the United States, this initiative can help foster a common understanding of underlying principles and can have far-reaching impact. There is a nature.release of Joint roadmap Common terms and metrics for assessing trust and risk in artificial intelligence (AI) are a good example. Agreement on common taxonomies and approaches to risk management could pave the way for joint AI standards. This strengthens the standing of the EU and the US in international standards bodies and helps spread transatlantic standards around the world. But like a memorandum of understanding on digital development cooperation, a shared repository of metrics to measure trust in AI is unlikely to make the news.

Convergence in these and other areas facilitated by the TTC may not lead to perfect regulatory alignment, but it can advance common principles and reduce barriers to trade and research cooperation. .

room for improvement

This is not to say that the TTC was wholly successful. Indeed, it is frustrating to see transatlantic friction lead to neglect in some areas where more cooperation is urgently needed. For example, if the EU and US do not find a way to work more closely together on his 6G development, There is a real risk that China’s Huawei will dominate the global marketThe issue was featured heavily at previous summits, but now appears to have been pushed down to the TTC agenda. This is likely because the US government continues to pursue it under pressure from US industry lobbyists. Premature Promise of Open RAN As a way to diversify the market in favor of new American competitors.

Such disagreements have led to a “buy America” and the EU’s geopolitical immaturity, TTC cooperation continued to be in jeopardy. But the initiative has not exacerbated these problems. Instead, it provides additional incentives for solving them. Despite misunderstandings and grievances about the TTC, it is imperative for EU and US officials to defend and promote the initiative, which remains a valuable means of achieving long-term positive impact. increase.

It should be noted that the TTC is primarily a mechanism for “coordinating approaches to the world’s major technological, economic and trade issues and formulating policies based on shared democratic values”. It seems that. The TTC does not solve all transatlantic trade and technology problems. The EU will not become a geopolitical force like the US overnight. The US won’t be at the forefront of digital regulation like her EU anytime soon. Also, TTC summits don’t always make big (positive) headlines. With that articulated on both sides of the Atlantic, TTC can continue to make valuable contributions towards the transatlantic market of emerging technologies and digital transformation, building on shared values.